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 “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable 
from magic.”1 
The defining characteristic of a 3D printer is that it turns 
bits into stuff. This causal connection between the world of 
thoughts and the world of things is more than a little uncanny. 
3D printing is a technology of such surprise and wonder that it 
verges on the magical. 
It is also, Kyle Dolinsky argues, a problem for copyright law.2 
The heart of his Note is a search for analogies to CAD files in 
copyright case law. He works methodically through architectural 
plans, technical drawings, recipes, and computer programs3—all 
things that consist of instructions for making other things. These 
analogies have something else in common, too: they’re difficult, 
contested ground in copyright, which has never dealt cleanly with 
multiple media or multiple layers of meaning. 
This bad news is also good news. 3D printing is as hard as 
some of the most notoriously difficult parts of copyright—but it is 
also no harder. To the extent that the copyright system is capable 
of resolving these other controversial cases, it is also capable of 
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 1. Arthur C. Clarke, Hazards of Prophecy: The Failure of the Imagination, 
in PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE 12, 21 
n.1 (rev. ed. 1973). 
 2. See generally Kyle A. Dolinsky, Note, CAD’s Cradle: Untangling 
Copyrightability, Derivative Works, and Fair Use in 3D Printing, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV __, __ (2014). 
 3. See id. at __ (comparing CAD files to these other types of works and 
concluding that all of the analogies are imperfect). 
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resolving 3D printing cases. To see why, it helps to abstract away 
from the details of 3D printing itself. Instead, let us start from 
the wisdom of Clarke’s Third Law;4 that beyond a certain point, 
the technological details no longer matter. What if 3D printers 
are actually are magic? 
I. 
Ulrich has a Replicio wand. When he waves it with the right 
flick of his wrist, it makes a perfect duplicate of the object he 
waves it at. 
The copyright treatment of the Replicio wand is simple. 
When Ulrich uses it to duplicate an object, he has created a 
“copy.”5 His only good argument that his copy is noninfringing 
will be that the object is not subject to copyright in the first 
place.6 The strength of this argument depends on what the object 
is. A first-century bust of Homer is in the public domain; 
duplicating it with my wand violates no one’s rights. A twenty-
first-century bust of Homer Simpson is copyrighted; duplicating it 
with the wand makes me an infringer. 
There is nothing special about three-dimensional objects in 
this respect.7 If Ulrich waves the wand at Rembrandt’s two-
dimensional public-domain painting Aristotle Contemplating a 
Bust of Homer, his duplicate will not infringe. To be sure, some 
three-dimensional objects are uncopyrightable for a distinctive 
reason: because they are “useful articles” whose practical aspects 
are inseparable from their aesthetic features,8 such as bicycle 
                                                                                                     
 4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (“Any sufficiently advanced 
technology is indistinguishable from magic.”). 
 5. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copies” as “material objects . . . in 
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”). 
 6. See id. § 106(1) (providing that, except for fair use and other 
limitations, the owner of a valid copyright has the exclusive right to “reproduce 
the copyrighted work in copies”).  
 7. See id. § 101 (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”); id. 
§ 102(a)(5) (making them protectable). 
 8. See id. § 101 (defining “useful article[s]” as objects “having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function” and excluding them from protection unless “such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
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racks9 and casino uniforms.10 But to understand the Replicio 
wand, we need to know only whether a three-dimensional object 
is copyrighted; nothing turns on why. 
Thus, if we are capable of deciding which three-dimensional 
objects are copyrighted—a question to which copyright law 
already purports to have an answer—we are capable of saying 
that using a 3D printer to duplicate them infringes. Like the 
wand, it reproduces every last scrap of expression; a duplicate 
infringes if and only if the initial object was copyrightable.11 This 
is not by any means an easy question, but it is no harder than 
current copyright doctrine. 
II.  
3D printing is not, however, quite this simple. 3D printers do 
not work directly from objects any more than regular 2D printers 
work directly from books. Instead, 3D printers start from 
specialized CAD files: the 3D equivalents of PDFs.12  
The magical equivalent of a CAD file is a long scroll 
containing an intricate spell. When read aloud, the scroll conjures 
up an object. What kind of object depends on the spell: a chair 
scroll makes a chair, a broom scroll makes a broom. Read a broom 
scroll twice and you have two brooms. 
When I use my Replicio wand to duplicate a bust of Homer 
Simpson, I infringe. But what if Gandalf and Saruman break the 
process into two steps? Gandalf makes a scroll to create busts of 
                                                                                                     
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article”). 
 9. See Brandir Int’l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 
(2d Cir. 1987). 
 10. See Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 
2005). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 413 (“To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 
show ownership of a valid copyright and actionable copying.”).  
 12. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at __ (comparing the STL format to the 3D 
version of a PDF) (quoting Michael Weinberg, What’s the Deal with Copyright 
and 3D Printing?, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 14 (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyri
ght_%20Final%20version2.pdf).  
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Homer Simpson, and Saruman uses the scroll to make a bust. Are 
these infringing “copies” of the initial bust?13 
A.  
Saruman’s case is simpler. Just as it doesn’t matter whether 
I use a Replicio wand, a 3D printer, or hammer and chisel to 
produce infringing Simpsons memorabilia, it doesn’t matter that 
Saruman works from a scroll. At the end of the process, he has a 
bust of Homer Simpson where none existed before. That bust is 
still a copy; it still infringes. As before, Saruman is in trouble if 
and only if the object Gandalf started from was copyrightable. 
B.  
Gandalf’s case is more interesting, but in the end the result 
is the same. The apparent difficulty is that the scroll doesn’t look 
like the object it describes. A chair scroll and a broom scroll are 
far more similar in appearance than a chair and a broom. If you 
showed me a scroll to make a bust of Homer Simpson, I wouldn’t 
recognize it. 
There was a time when copyright law distinguished between 
a copy that humans would recognize and a copy they would not, 
but that time was 1908. In that year, the Supreme Court held 
that player piano rolls weren’t “copies” of the music encoded in 
them, writing that “even those skilled in the making of these rolls 
are unable to read them as musical compositions.”14 Unlike sheet 
music, which is “addressed to the eye,” piano rolls were only “part 
of a machine.”15 
Congress promptly obliterated the idea that mere 
“mechanical reproductions” of music were immune from 
copyright, creating a system of royalties for them in the 
                                                                                                     
 13. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copies” as “material objects . . . 
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”). 
 14. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). 
 15. Id. at 12 (quoting Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1888)). 
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Copyright Act of 1909.16 Two years later, the Supreme Court held 
that a celluloid film-stock version of Ben Hur infringed on the 
book,17 and since then shifting between media has not generally 
been a defense to a copyright lawsuit.18 The modern Copyright 
Act explicitly repudiates the distinction between human-
intelligible and technological copies. Today a “copy” infringes 
whether it can be perceived “directly” or whether it requires “the 
aid of a machine or device.”19 A 3D printer is just such a device. 
Nor does it matter how the scroll is produced. Some wizards, 
like Hermione Granger, are capable of taking an object and 
writing out longhand the corresponding scroll to make another. 
Others, more like Ron Weasley, prefer to use a Transcriptio wand 
to make their scrolls for them. (The distinction, of course, 
corresponds to the difference between hand-authored and 
scanned CAD files.)20 Either way, the scroll is treated like the 
object it makes: both of them infringe if the object they were 
made from is copyrightable. 
C.  
Thus, despite the superficial difference between 2D and 3D, 
copyright law treats these scrolls just like the objects they make. 
The duplicate bust of Homer Simpson and the scroll that makes a 
duplicate bust of Homer Simpson are both infringing “copies” of 
the initial bust. The initial bust and the duplicate bust are both 
sculptural works, while the scroll merely “portrays” a sculptural 
work, but that makes no difference. All three contain the same 
                                                                                                     
 16. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1974) (current version at 17 
U.S.C. § 106(5)–(6) (2012)). 
 17. Kalem Co. v Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); see also Harper & 
Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1909) (describing motion picture 
technology). 
 18. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 
352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that defendant infringed by converting tens 
of thousands of CDs into MP3 files). 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Reading a scroll aloud “reproduce[s]” the object 
it describes; a 3D printer is a “machine or device” used to “reproduce[]” a CAD 
file. Id.; see also Dolinsky, supra note 2, at ___ (describing the 3D printing 
process). 
 20. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at __ (discussing the differences).  
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copyrightable expression. The unauthorized CAD file made from 
a Homer Simpson bust infringes, even before you print out the 
bust itself. 
III.  
But there is more. There is always more. So far, we have 
been considering claims by the copyright owner of the initial 
object against the team of Gandalf and Saruman. But what about 
the copyright owners of scrolls? Suppose that Morgaine has 
composed a scroll to make an object. Will copyright protect her 
from pirate wizards? 
A. 
Merlin is crafty: he realizes that his Replicio wand works just 
as well on scrolls as it does on busts.21 So even though no bust of 
Homer Simpson is available for him to duplicate, Merlin is 
undeterred. He simply uses his wand to duplicate Morgaine’s 
bust-making scroll. 
When challenged, Merlin might argue that he has copied 
nothing copyrightable, since Morgaine never had a bust of Homer 
Simpson in the first place. But just as a bust of Homer Simpson 
and a scroll describing a bust of Homer Simpson are equally 
infringing, so too a bust and a scroll describing a bust are equally 
protected as originals. Others infringe when they copy it.22 As 
long as the object Morgaine had in mind was copyrightable, 
Merlin’s copy of her scroll to create it infringes. 
Again, there is nothing special about magic scrolls or 3D 
printers. As long as something is copyrightable, sufficiently 
                                                                                                     
 21. As this example shows, the distinction between two and three 
dimensions gives way when pressed. All objects are three-dimensional, and thus 
so are all the copies of any work. Any particular copy of Aristotle Contemplating 
a Bust of Homer, the original included, is a three-dimensional object. Calling it 
“two-dimensional” is a way of saying the third dimension is irrelevant. The 
expression in the words of a novel is independent of the thickness of the paper 
they are printed on. 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“The term ‘copies’ includes the material object . . . 
in which the work is first fixed by any method now known or later 
developed . . . .”). 
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detailed instructions for making it are copyrightable, too. 
Architectural plans are copyrightable because buildings are.23 
JPEG files are copyrightable because images are. It is true that 
copyright does not protect functional material.24 But the 
“functionality” of scrolls and CAD files is a red herring when their 
function is to produce copyrightable objects. Saying that a CAD 
file is functional to make a bust of Homer Simpson is like saying 
that MP3 files are functional to make music. So they are: it is the 
expression in the underlying busts and songs that makes the files 
copyrightable in some hands and infringing in others. 
B.  
But this is not the end of the story because this is not the 
only way that Morgaine’s scroll could be copyrightable. Suppose, 
for example, that it has decorative flourishes that are completely 
unrelated to the object it produces: swash caps and line drawings 
of sea monsters in the margins.25 
When a scroll contains decorative features that are wholly 
incidental to what it does, the scroll itself is independently 
expressive, like an antique map or an illuminated manuscript.26 
Indeed, even if Morgaine’s artistic vision outstrips her magical 
talent so that the scroll she writes is beautiful but does nothing 
when read aloud, it is still a work of authorship—a “pictorial” or 
“graphic” work, to be precise.27 A collector might hang it on her 
                                                                                                     
 23. See id. § 101 (defining “architectural work[s]”); id. § 102(a)(8) (making 
them protectable). 
 24. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to 
any . . . procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation . . . .”). 
 25. In Dolinsky’s taxonomy, the 3D printer equivalent would be to 
decorative touches in the design drawings used to produce the computer code in 
the CAD files.  See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at __ (arguing that authorship and 
copyrightability of computer code in a CAD file, respectively, will depend on the 
extent to which CAD software programmers and CAD designers, respectively, 
are responsible for recognizable segments of code). 
 26. But see Zhang v. Heineken N.V., No. CV 08-6506 GAF (RCx), 2010 WL 
4457460, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2010) (concluding that work of Chinese 
calligraphy was uncopyrightable). 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “pictorial” and “graphical” works), 
id § 102(a) (making copyrightable “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression”). 
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wall for decoration, not even knowing what Morgaine intended it 
to do. 
If so, then Merlin will still infringe by duplicating the scroll—
even when the underlying object is uncopyrightable. The low-
level CAD files used in 3D printers, however, tend not to have 
this incidental kind of unrelated expression embedded in them. 
They are like scrolls printed in a uniform mechanical typeface, 
with no decorative features whatsoever. 
C. 
There is also a third way that Morgaine’s scroll could 
implicate the kind of expression that copyright cares about. The 
necessary originality to make it copyrightable could be found not 
in the object it describes or in its purely decorative features, but 
in the words it uses to describe the object. That is, the scroll is not 
just a portrayal of a 3D sculptural work, and not just a 2D 
pictorial work, but also a 1D literary work. 
Different scrolls may use different words to do the same 
thing. Morgaine and Gandalf will not describe a chair in the same 
way; the scrolls they write out will have different instructions for 
recreating it. When I read aloud from Morgaine’s scroll I will 
speak different syllables than when I read from Gandalf’s scroll, 
even though the chairs I end up with are identical in every way. 
Does the difference in wording matter? 
One approach to the question treats a chair scroll like a 
photograph of the chair: both purport to represent the chair’s 
appearance. In copyright terms, they are “derivative works” 
based on the chair.28 Just as a photograph of an uncopyrightable 
vodka bottle can be copyrightable because it embodies the 
photographer’s choices “about lighting, shading, angle, 
background, and so forth,”29 the scroll embodies Morgaine’s 
choices about how to describe the chair. 
                                                                                                     
 28. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon 
one or more preexisting works” including any “form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted”); id. § 103(a) (making derivative works 
copyrightable). 
 29. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Another approach inverts the question; it looks not to how a 
scroll was made but to how it is to be used. The words on the 
scroll, like the text of a computer program, are speech acts: they 
cause something to happen when read in the right way. Whether 
they are a proper subject of copyright is precisely the question 
that Congress asked the Commission on New Technological Uses 
(CONTU) to confront in the 1970s.30 CONTU recommended,31 and 
Congress agreed,32 that computer programs should be protected 
in this way—as literary works.33 The choice was and is 
controversial, but the law is settled.34 
Either way, if Morgaine’s scroll has distinctive wording, 
Merlin the plagiarist will infringe. Of course, not all scrolls will 
actually feature this kind of expression. Some will fall beneath 
the threshold of minimal originality: a scroll to make a cube is 
likely to be completely generic.35 Others will involve no 
meaningful human authorship, as where a particularly stodgy 
wizard uses a Transcriptio wand to make a “slavish cop[y]” of the 
chair in front of her.36 Still others will describe the object using 
the same words that any other wizard would have to use to 
                                                                                                     
 30. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED 
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978) (noting that CONTU’s purpose was to “address 
the problems raised by the use of new technolog[y] of . . . computers”). 
 31. See ID. AT 9–12 (recommending copyright protection for computer 
programs). 
 32. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “computer program”). 
 33. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 
1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Thus a computer program . . . is a ‘literary work’ and 
is protected from unauthorized copying.”). 
 34. Compare, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against 
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 
DUKE L.J. 663, 703–53 (criticizing software copyright), with, e.g., Arthur R. 
Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 982–
85 (1993) (defending software copyright). 
 35. See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 
F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that “common geometric shapes” are 
uncopyrightable, and collecting cases). 
 36. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). Yet again, nothing turns on the number of dimensions. There is 
no more originality in a perfectly detailed scan of a car than in a perfectly 
detailed photograph of a painting. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales 
USA, Inc., 528 F. 3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008) (calling a scan of a 3D object “a 
peculiar type of copying”). 
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describe it: a chair has “four” “legs” and not “five” “arms.” These 
expressive details merge with the idea of describing a chair; they 
too are uncopyrightable.37 And finally, the rules of magic will 
sharply constrain the permissible descriptions of a chair; it would 
hardly do for a chair-making scroll to contain a sequence of 
syllables that summons up a herd of rampaging wildebeests. All 
of these uncopyrightable elements will need to be filtered from 
the scroll’s wording in assessing its overall copyrightability.38 
D. 
To summarize, a scroll might be copyrightable because it 
makes a copyrightable object, because it uses copyrightable words 
to describe the object, or because it adds copyrightable decoration 
to those words. With CAD files, the first will be present 
frequently, the second occasionally, and the third rarely. If any of 
the three are present, those who copy the CAD file are infringers. 
It does not make a major difference whether the chicken or 
the egg comes first. Some wizards create scrolls “drawn from the 
life”39 based on existing 3D objects. Others can work “entirely 
from [their] own original mental conception”40 and compose a 
scroll from scratch, a scroll that will produce an object whose like 
has never before existed in the world. Obviously, a wizard who 
works from a preexisting object cannot lay claim to the 
copyrightable features of the object itself (unless she was also the 
author of the object), but both she and the wizard who works from 
scratch have a copyright in their choice of wording and any 
decorative flourishes.41 
                                                                                                     
 37. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–
08 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that elements dictated by efficiency are not 
copyrightable because the potentially copyrightable expression has merged with 
the uncopyrightable idea). 
 38. Cf. id. at 707–10 (describing the filtration step of the abstraction–
filtration–comparison test for computer software, in which the uncopyrightable 
elements of code are filtered out). 
 39. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
There, the Court concluded that works based on existing objects are not thereby 
excluded from copyrightability. Id. at 252. 
 40. Burrow-Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
 41. In copyright terms, these works “portraying” a sculptural work are 
copyrightable to the extent that they are original literary or pictorial works. See 
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IV.  
There is one more important possibility. Consider Saruman 
again, who reads aloud a scroll. Unlike Merlin, who duplicated 
the scroll itself, Saruman never creates a potentially infringing 
copy of the scroll. Certainly, he infringes if the object the scroll 
describes is copyrightable. (Morgaine, who made the scroll, may 
be the copyright owner of the object it describes, or she may not. 
That affects only who has standing to sue Saruman, not whether 
he infringes.42) 
But, as we have seen, there are other ways a scroll could be 
copyrightable besides simply depicting a copyrightable object. Its 
decorative features as a pictorial or graphic work—its swoops and 
whirls and marginalia—are irrelevant to Saruman. When he 
reads the scroll’s words aloud, he will ignore the swash caps and 
doodles. None of these details will end up in the object that 
results. The resulting object does not infringe because it is not 
substantially similar to the scroll’s copyrightable elements: they 
are copyrightable but not copied. 
It might at first seem that the wording stands on the same 
footing as the decorations. The bust of Homer Simpson 
remembers neither the words used to make it nor what the scroll 
they were written on looked like. There is no way to reconstruct 
the scroll’s wording or flourishes no matter how closely you study 
the bust. A wizard setting out to make a fresh scroll would have 
to start from square one and would end up with a scroll that 
                                                                                                     
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring only originality and fixation in a tangible 
medium for copyrightability). In practice, courts apply a heightened filter of 
originality when the author starts from a preexisting work not of her own 
making because of the need to distinguish the original features of the 
underlying work from the original features of the work that portrays it. See, e.g., 
ATC Distrib. Group. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 
700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring “great skill” or “substantial variation” 
(quoting L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976); Alva 
Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)); Entm’t 
Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(requiring that the original aspects of the derivative work be more than trivial 
and that the derivative does not affect the scope of the protection in the original) 
(citing Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980)).  
 42. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012) (providing that “[t]he legal or beneficial 
owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled” to sue for infringement 
of that right). 
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resembled Morgaine’s scroll only by similarity of subject and by 
coincidence—neither of which would suffice to infringe. 
But the wording is different in one important way: Saruman 
reads it aloud. This means that he “performs” the literary 
features of the scroll by reading it.43 And if this recital takes place 
at Arthur’s court before the assembled knights, it will be a 
“public” performance and will infringe.44 Saruman will need to 
stay in his tower to steer clear of copyright danger by making 
only a private performance. 
Thus, there are important differences between Saruman, who 
reads Morgaine’s scroll aloud to make a duplicate of the object it 
describes, and Merlin, who makes a duplicate of the object itself. 
When that object is a bust of Homer rather than one of Homer 
Simpson (i.e. it is not copyrighted), Saruman can read the scroll 
aloud without implicating its copyrightable flourishes, whereas 
Merlin cannot zap the scroll with a Replicio wand without also 
copying those flourishes. The Copyright Act is far from a model of 
clarity on this point,45 and so is the case law construing it,46 but 
the courts generally have decided that Saruman does not infringe 
but Merlin might.47 
Thus, in theory, users are free to print uncopyrightable 3D 
objects from copyrightable CAD files without fear of infringing. 
                                                                                                     
 43. See id. § 101 (“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, 
or act it . . . .”). 
 44. See id. § 101 (defining “public[]” performances); id. § 106 (giving the 
copyright owner the exclusive right to “perform the copyrighted work publicly”). 
 45. These cases turn on one of the most obscure sentences in the 1976 
Copyright Act: 
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a 
useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, 
distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to 
such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a 
State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a 
court in an action brought under this title. 
Id. § 113(b).  
 46. The general consensus is that the pre-1978 law carried forward by 
§ 113(b) adopted the rule stated in the text. See, e.g., Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F. 
Supp. 2d 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that plaintiff’s copyright in a 
technical drawing does not prohibit defendants from manufacturing the article 
that the drawing depicts). 
 47. Cf. Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 433–38 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2003) (concluding that defendant’s cabinets did not infringe on plaintiff’s 
copyright in a technical drawing of those cabinets). 
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Courts tend to say that using technical diagrams to make an 
uncopyrightable object does not infringe but that copying the 
diagrams themselves does.48 If so, then woe betide the defendant 
who makes a copy of the plaintiff’s copyrighted technical 
drawings in order to manufacture the uncopyrightable useful 
articles they describe. 
This is, however, the point at which the magical analogy to 
3D printing breaks down. People can read a scroll aloud without 
copying it, but a 3D printer needs an electronic copy of a CAD file 
to make the object.49 Thus, under the so-called MAI doctrine, even 
temporary versions in a computer’s memory are potentially 
infringing copies, 3D printers are Merlins rather than 
Sarumans.50 A CAD file is quite possibly protected against 
unauthorized 3D printing, even where the resulting object is not 
copyrightable.51 
V.  
One further concern is pragmatic rather than conceptual: 
enforcement. Music and movies have had enforcement problems 
in spades since Napster52 and its nephews. Now that the world of 
bits is colonizing the world of atoms, the makers of things are 
about to learn that they are less special than they may have 
thought.53 They confront exactly the same enforcement 
                                                                                                     
 48. See, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 753, 760 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (distinguishing technical drawings (there, of 
a recreational vehicle), which accord no protection in the vehicle itself, from 
architectural plans, which accord protection in the completed structure under a 
specific exception to the general rule). 
 49. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at __ (describing the 3D printing process).  
 50. The doctrine takes its name from MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F. 3d 121, 127–30 (2d Cir. 2008) (distinguishing MAI for 
short-lived copies). 
 51. Another line of cases suggests that these intermediate copies might be 
fair uses because they are mere way stations on the road to noninfringing final 
uses. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 
1992) (finding fair use where “humans . . . cannot gain access to the unprotected 
ideas . . . contained in [software] without . . . making copies”). 
 52. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
 53. See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D 
Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) 
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challenges: consumerized infringement-facilitating technologies; 
all-but-undetectable end-user copying; and an instantaneous 
worldwide distribution network. The 3D printer is the new CD-
ROM drive.  
The doctrinal details are daunting, from assessing whether a 
wandmaker’s design has significant noninfringing uses54 to 
checking scroll dealers’ compliance with the ins and outs of the 
Digital Magic Copyright Act’s notice-and-takedown regime.55 But 
copyright’s overall framework of secondary liability and statutory 
remedies does not significantly change when file-sharers are 
swapping magic spells or CAD files rather than episodes of Game 
of Thrones. 
VI.  
I have not rung all of the changes on these ideas that 
Dolinsky does; he considers, in addition, the two-step process of 
making scrolls from drawings, and the considerations that will 
enter into case-by-case fair use determinations.56 But I take it 
that he and I are in substantial agreement on the issues I have 
described. That we have reached similar conclusions despite our 
very different ways of approaching the problem strikes me as an 
encouraging sign. Copyright law, we agree, still has a little magic 
left in it. 
It may be surprising that so little in copyright law needs to 
change to accommodate 3D printers. But copyright law has long 
been comfortable with 3D printing’s defining relationship 
between ideas and items. For centuries, the metaphysical 
                                                                                                     
(manuscript at 27–32, 50–52), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2338067 (comparing the intellectual property problems posed 
by 3D printing to other issues that courts have resolved in the past, and 
proposing a “Patent and Trademark DMCA” to help manage 3D printing). 
 54. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 
(1984) (concluding that because Sony’s Betamax VCR was capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses, Sony was not liable for contributory infringement). 
 55. Cf. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (requiring 
online service providers to remove potentially infringing content if they receive 
from the copyright owner a take-down notice that complies with statutory 
requirements). 
 56. See Dolinsky, supra note 2, at __ (discussing derivative works and fair 
use in the context of 3D printing). 
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM MAGIC 15 
magicians of copyright have drawn a sharp distinction between 
tangible copies and intangible works.57 Printed objects are copies; 
so too, are CAD files. Moving back and forth from one to the other 
is just Transfiguration; the work’s identity remains.  
The copy may disintegrate as the focus of copyright, and 
perhaps should. But as long as there is something we can call 
copyright, it will still summon up works of authorship from the 
vasty deep. You cannot see, touch, or hear a work—only a 
particular copy or performance of it. But copyright has no doubt 
that works exist; they are immanent in every copy even as they 
transcend this physical world. The foundation of copyright law is 
the claim that this invisible essence can be reduced to ownership 
by human hands. Is this magic, or magical thinking? 
                                                                                                     
 57. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (“Transfer of ownership of any material 
object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does 
not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object.”). 
